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important lessons for the practitioners of
military operations other than war. Effective peacekeeping and nation building
are not cheap, easy, or brief, but their execution can be greatly facilitated by competent, cohesive, and effective
interservice and interagency teams.
JAMES JAY CARAFANO

Executive Editor
Joint Force Quarterly

Paul, Septimus H. Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American
Atomic Relations, 1941–1952. Columbus: Ohio State
Univ. Press, 2000. 266pp. $42.50

With the collapse of Soviet power and the
end of the Cold War, the paradigm that
helped to explain that era shifted. Scholars
seeking to understand better the period
are now free to reassess that era, taking
into account other variables in the power
calculus with the same degree of attention previously concentrated upon the
Soviet Union. To cite just one example of
this paradigm shift, since the opening of
recent British archives scholars have concluded that British foreign and defense
policy had a much more decisive impact
on the early Cold War than was apparent
in earlier considerations. The new study
by Septimus H. Paul is one such
reassessment.
Paul is a professor of history at the College of Lake County in Grayslake, Illinois.
His Nuclear Rivals is a meticulous examination of Anglo-American wartime collaboration in the development of the
atomic bomb, followed by the decision of
the United States after the war to deny
Great Britain the fruits of that collaboration—the requisite technologies to build
a British atomic bomb. To British eyes,
this was a betrayal of solemn (if secret)
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promises made by President Franklin
Roosevelt to Prime Minister Winston
Churchill during the war and of understandings between President Harry Truman
and Prime Minister Clement Attlee
afterward.
Part of the complexity of Anglo-American
relations is to be explained by their
multileveled nature. The alliance against
Hitler during World War II forged a
common front, which coexisted with
substantive differences over grand strategy and the postwar political-economic
settlement, particularly on questions relating to open markets and decolonization. The desire of the British to exercise
joint partnership with the United States
in the monopoly of the atomic bomb,
and the American reluctance to do so,
proved to be particularly divisive. These
profound differences continued into the
postwar world but were overshadowed by
the American and British governments’
perceived fear of the common threat
from Soviet Russia. One of the truly valuable contributions of Nuclear Rivals is
Paul’s fidelity to this complexity and to
the sources in relating the story of American collaboration and noncollaboration
with Britain in atomic weapons development. Paul makes no attempt to sweeten
or marginalize the differences between
the two nations in this area; his approach
is explicit, without attention to peripheral issues.
The major contribution of this book is its
attention to what used to be called in the
literature “the raw materials question.”
This relates to the American attempt during World War II to secure a monopoly
of the world’s uranium supply. One complication for the Americans was that the
source of the highest-quality uranium,
absolutely indispensable for building an
atomic bomb, was the then Belgian
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Congo. Paul presents a compelling picture of Anglo-American maneuvering—on the American side, for an
indefinite monopoly over the uranium
output of the Shinkolobwe Mine; and on
the British side, to secure first an allocation of uranium on a fifty-fifty basis with
the United States, and then to trade off
the British allocation in return for the
technical details of the American atomic
bomb. In this relationship, the British
had rather decisive advantages, which
they did not fail to exploit fully—a particularly close relationship with the Belgian government, and the fact that
British investors owned 30 percent of the
shares of Union Menère du Haut
Katanga, which owned the Shinkolobwe
Mine. Paul’s appreciation of this intimate
relationship and its consequences for the
United States is worth noting. Should
Great Britain be so disposed, “it could
and would secure a monopoly over the
Belgian Congo raw materials. The United
States would then be in a most disadvantageous position.” When the British in
1946 threatened to end the Combined
Development Trust (CDT), the agency,
established in 1944, responsible for joint
acquisition and allocation of raw materials, the United States capitulated to British demands and agreed to a fifty-fifty
allocation of uranium with Britain. This
equitable allocation allowed Britain to
amass a huge stockpile, without which it
could never have detonated an atomic
bomb in October 1952. By 1947 the
United States was experiencing a severe
shortage of uranium, which could be met
only from supplies in the Congo and
from that British stockpile. Tough negotiations secured Britain an exchange of
atomic information in return for American access to all Congo allocations to be
made in 1948–49 and, if needed, additional supplies from the British stockpile.
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This arrangement was sanctified in a
“modus vivendi” signed on 7 January
1948. The political counterpoint to this
“agreement” could be found in the characterization by Edmund Gullion, a special assistant to Undersecretary of State
Robert Lovett: Gullion had suggested
calling this agreement a “modus vivendi,” since that was “a term most often
used to describe the relations between
adversaries driven by circumstances to
get along together.”
The single area where I find myself in
disagreement with Paul is his assertion
that “American postwar atomic energy
policy would be formulated, for the most
part, not by the President but by this
[government] bureaucracy.” This is a
very wide generalization, not supported
by the evidence. On the contrary, no
president has abdicated his responsibility
for the formulation of nuclear weapons
policy to a bureaucracy, however talented.
Paul himself makes this very point at the
outset of his book, arguing that when
Roosevelt and Churchill secretly negotiated the Hyde Park aide-memoire in September 1944, they agreed to continue
postwar atomic cooperation. While that
promise was disingenuous on Roosevelt’s
part, the key point was that “the decision
was made with no input from the President’s advisers.” President Truman’s action in signing the McMahon Act in
August 1946 is perhaps the clearest indicator of his intent to oppose the sharing
of America’s atomic secrets with any nation, Britain included. The McMahon
Act prohibited transferring to any other
nation the scientific and technological information necessary to manufacture an
atomic bomb. The successful detonation
of a British hydrogen bomb in May 1957
led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to
overrule such advisers as the chairman of
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the Atomic Energy Commission, Admiral
Lewis Strauss, and to secure an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1958.
This amendment provided for a renewed
bilateral exchange of nuclear weapons
technologies with Great Britain. The extent to which presidential advisers got
out in front of nuclear policy and played
the role of staunch opponents of bilateral
cooperation is well and properly documented in Nuclear Rivals. Indeed, the accurate portrayal of their roles in both the
Roosevelt and Truman administrations,
in war and peace, is a major asset of this
book. Yet any implication of presidential
abdication of the policy formulation role
in this sphere is a misconstruction.
The caveat above notwithstanding,
Septimus H. Paul has made a particularly
valuable contribution to the literature. In
his use of sources, Paul reveals a sophisticated understanding of the power calculus and refocuses our attention on some
of the seminal issues and disagreements
of the early Cold War period, with all
their complexities. For just these reasons,
Nuclear Rivals should be required reading not only for historians of this era but
for all students of national security policy
making.
MYRON A. GREENBERG

Defense Contract Management Agency/DCM Dayton

Daso, Dik Alan. Hap Arnold and the Evolution of
American Airpower. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000. 233pp. $23.95

Henry “Hap” Arnold was one of our
great commanders. The only airman to
hold five-star rank, he led the Army Air
Forces through World War II with a
strength, tenacity, and vision that was instrumental to victory, while at the same
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time breaking his own health. Dik Daso,
a former Air Force fighter pilot, Ph.D.,
and curator at the National Air and
Space Museum, tells Arnold’s important
story with unusual insight and verve.
Graduating from West Point in 1907, Arnold earnestly desired an assignment to
the cavalry but instead was posted to the
infantry. Despite exciting and formative
experiences in the Philippines, he still
hankered for the cavalry. Once again he
was refused. He then transferred to the
Signal Corps, and in 1911 he became one
of our first military pilots. Fate. Over the
next three decades he became widely recognized as an outstanding aviator (he
won the coveted Mackay Trophy twice),
commander, and staff officer. When Oscar Westover, chief of the Air Corps, was
killed in a plane crash in September 1938,
Arnold took his place and led the air arm
for the next seven years. But the long
hours and incredible pace he set for himself took their toll. He suffered severe
heart attacks during the war, and another
in 1950 took his life.
Other books have been written about Arnold, and his memoirs are packed with
detail. Nonetheless, Daso was able to uncover family sources and documents not
previously used that shed new light on
Arnold the man, husband, and father.
This approach makes for fascinating
reading; it is always a comfort to know
that great men are as human as ourselves.
Daso also highlights a unique aspect of
Arnold’s life—his appreciation for the
integral relationship between science,
technology, and airpower. Early in his career Arnold recognized that a second-rate
air force was worse than none at all. The
path to aviation leadership was a strong
research-and-development program and
a commitment to progress. Arnold’s vision in this regard was extraordinary. He
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